Video Transcript

Terence A. Todman—Example of Excellence:

Highlight

I suppose getting the authorization for the United States to use military bases in Spain.  This occurred just after the death of Franco.  The American military had been quite accustomed to going to Franco, making arrangements.  He made the decision and we got what we wanted.  And, once Spain became a democracy, the democratic process came into being, and negotiations were a lot more difficult.  We reached a point where it was almost going to be a refusal, because the main base at Torrejon was not as available.  And we were almost at a point of having the things break down, and I got the King of Spain to agree to speak to the President of the United States.  And at that level they reached agreement on what would be acceptable on both sides.  So we were able to get agreements again to use all those bases in Spain, the air bases so important for action in Europe and the big naval base at Rota.  Getting that done in those circumstances I think was very special. 

And one of the things that was really important was to help Spain become a member of NATO.  And the terrific change that occurred in Spain was that at first the attitude of Spain toward NATO was against the organization and certainly not with Spain as a member.  But we began to work together, and we did bilateral exercises – U.S. and Spanish forces.  We expanded it.  We used NATO doctrine for that.  We expanded gradually to include other NATO countries.  And during the negotiations for the bases we had a fantastic period where we would negotiate on two hypotheses – one, Spain as a member of NATO, how the articles would read, and two, Spain not a member of NATO.  So we were working on two sets of text at the same time.  We did complete the negotiations on the bilateral agreement for the use of the bases, and then elections were held.  And the Socialist government won the elections.  We had negotiated with the Conservatives, and everyone was throwing up their hands in frustration.  What’s going to happen now that the opposition had taken over?  They negotiated exactly the same text, because in the negotiations we had respected Spanish rights.  We understood, as you must, that the other side has something to gain from negotiations.  So the text was quite agreeable.  They moved around some of the language within the agreement in order to show something more forceful.  “Either side can denounce this negotiation.”  Sure.  “No nuclear weapons would be based in Spain.”  Sure.  These were in the text, but you bring them up front where people can see them, and it looks like some real tough things had gone in there.  And that was fine.  Because what we’re interested in is the substance of the negotiations.

Low point

I think the lowest point was my failure to get the United States to agree to allow Somoza, the President of Nicaragua, to leave honorably.  He had had a heart attack, and he had agreed that he would leave.  We would have the president of the assembly take over for a short period, just in order to hold elections.  This seemed as though it was something that would work.  But there was a decision that Somoza had to be punished for all the harm he had done to the Nicaraguan people.  And when he was told he could not leave honorably, he decided he would fight to the end.  So that resulted in a great deal of bloodshed and a lot of property destruction and a wrecking of relations with the United States, which haunts us in our policy to this day.

Vignette

We agreed right at the beginning of the Carter Administration – that’s when I was the Assistant Secretary for Latin America Affairs – that we would enter into conversations with Cuba, to see if some of the thornier issues could be resolved.  And one of the things I remember very vividly was going up to New York, where we decided we’d have the whole meeting, the first meeting.

When it became time, Fidel Castro decided he wanted to see an American come down to Havana.  And so the Cubans dragged their feet when we got near the end of the time for our negotiations.  “Well, our President would like you to come down and bring your delegation down.”  And when I went back and told the Secretary of State that, I said, “I think we ought to go.”  He said he went over and told the White House, and the National Security Advisor said, “You can’t let Todman go down and do that, because Fidel Castro will eat him alive, and he’ll abuse the United States and take advantage of him.”  The Secretary of State told me that.  I said, “If you don’t think that I can defend myself and the United States, then what am I doing in this job?”  He said, “You want me to tell the President that?”  I said, “Of course.  That’s why I mentioned it.”  He came back at half past noon and said, “You can take the delegation down.”  So we went down.  It was near the end of April.  We were moving along well, and then I got a message on the 29th saying that “Fidel Castro wants to meet with you on the 2nd of May.”  I said, “Send a message back.  He can meet with me in the United States on the 2nd, but I will not be here on the 1st of May.”  You all know that the 1st of May, May Day, is a big Communist day – big celebration, big denunciations – and Fidel had hoped that somehow we would be there and sitting and having to go through all of this.   It didn’t work.  We got out in time.  The agreements were signed, ratified.  We got lots of American prisoners freed.  We got back all the property that had been in Cuba.  We got our embassy and our ambassador’s residence back.  We got an agreement to set up an interest section.  We all got out and things went smoothly after that.

Reflection

I enjoyed very much the stay in Denmark.  I had learned to sing the Danish national anthem as a boy growing up in the Virgin Islands.  Well, the Danes had been there until the U.S. had bought them in 1917.  Here was someone from a former Danish colony, going as the U.S. Ambassador to what used to be the colonial master.  The Danes were delighted to have me there.  There was an immediate relationship established.  And one Dane told me, “Too bad you hadn’t been born just a few years earlier.  You’d have been a Danish citizen. You might now be the Danish ambassador.”  I said, “Yeah, fat chance.”  That was under my breath, of course.  Being in Denmark, and seeing all the places we had heard about, and being in that atmosphere was great.  And the nature of the relationship between Denmark and the United States had been so very strong for such a long time that it was just a pleasure operating there.  Denmark of course, is an important member of NATO, and so we had that relationship.  Denmark is a member of the EC, and many of the issues that we needed to discuss with the Economic Community we were able to discuss with Denmark on a bilateral basis, and know that they would understand that we wanted to have someone in the organization speaking for things of interest to us.